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Abstract
Correlations of the type discussed by EPR in their original 1935 paradox
for continuous variables exist for the quadrature phase amplitudes of two
spatially separated fields. These correlations were experimentally reported
in 1992. We propose to use such EPR beams in quantum cryptography, to
transmit with high efficiency messages in such a way that the receiver and
sender may later determine whether eavesdropping has occurred. The merit
of the new proposal is in the possibility of transmitting a reasonably secure
yet predetermined key. This would allow relay of a cryptographic key over
long distances in the presence of lossy channels.
Intriguing is the possibility of using quantum mechanics to transmit signals in a way that
any eavesdropping can be detected by the receiver and sender. This new field of quantum
cryptography [1,2] has attracted much attention.
In the pioneering proposal of Bennett and Brassard [1] the sender (Alice) transmits to
the receiver (Bob) photon pulses in one of two orthogonal polarisations (labeled 0 and 1),
where the orientation (basis) of polarisation randomly shifts between 0o and 45o. The 0, 1
choice of polarisation represents the bit value. Bob randomly selects a basis (0o or 45o) for a
polarisation measurement, and records the resulting bit value. Alice and Bob later compare
notes, through a public channel, on the sequence of orientations (0o or 45o) chosen. The bit
sequence where Bob selected the same orientation as Alice forms a key, to be used later to
encrypt messages. While classically an eavesdropper could measure with perfect accuracy
components of polarisation along both directions, quantum mechanics forbids this by way of
the uncertainty principle. As a consequence the eavesdropper cannot always regenerate the
original state transmitted by Alice. The resulting discrepancy between the results recorded
by Alice and Bob gives warning to the interference by the eavesdropper. No discrepancy
implies a secure key.
Other proposals [2], such as that suggested by Ekert, propose to use a sequence of two
spatially separated photons with correlated polarisation, and whose joint polarisation mea-
surements are predicted by quantum mechanics to show a violation of a Bell inequality [3].
Such fields have no local hidden variable interpretation. Any measurement, and subsequent
state regeneration to mask interference, by an eavesdropper along one of these two channels
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will alter the statistics so that a Bell inequality is always satisfied. Again a fundamental
aspect of quantum mechanics is utilized to alert receiver and sender to eavesdropping.
The majority of proposals so far focus on the use of single photons to transmit informa-
tion. A significant current limitation to the practicality of such schemes is the poor efficiency
of photon counting detectors. This contributes to a significant loss factor which makes direct
efficient communication of sequences predetermined by Alice difficult. Photon-based pro-
posals rely in practice on establishing a sequence (key) a posteriori from infrequent detected
photons.
Recently Ralph [4] and Hillery [5] have suggested cryptographic schemes based on mea-
surement of (continuous variable) field quadrature phase amplitudes. In their proposals
Alice transmits a bit value by way of squeezed signals, which means that the fluctuation
in one quadrature phase amplitude is reduced to a level below that corresponding to the
standard quantum limit as determined by the uncertainty principle. Security is provided
as a result of the uncertainty principle since an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot measure both
noncommuting quadrature amplitudes to arbitrary accuracy. As a result Bob’s signal after
Eve’s interference will contain extra noise, detectable when Alice and Bob compare the bit
values received by Bob with the bit values sent by Alice. In this way, following the example
of Bennett and Brassard, a secure key can be established.
In this paper it is suggested to use continuous variable measurements in such a way
so as to allow transmission of a predetermined sequence (or key) directly from sender to
receiver. Later, communication through a public channel can check whether eavesdropping
has occurred. Security is provided not by comparison of Bob’s received with Alice’s sent bit
values, but by establishing whether Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations [6] between two
beams, one retained by Alice and the other transmitted with signal to Bob, are maintained
after transmission. In this last respect the proposal is not unlike the photon-based proposal
of Ekert where security is based on the confirmation by Alice and Bob of a violation of a
Bell inequality.
The scheme involves only quadrature phase amplitude measurements, which can be per-
formed with high efficiency. The predetermined nature of the sequence takes most advantage
of this high efficiency, since every bit value sent can contribute to the final message. This
contrasts with previous schemes for which part of the sequence, randomly selected after
transmission, is used only to establish security by way of the public channel.
The predetermined nature of the sequence could also aid incorporation of special re-
peaters, where the signal and correlated beams are regenerated to help compensate for
transmission loss. This method could potentially secure a single key between a single sender-
receiver pair a long distance apart.
Correlations of the type discussed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) in their orig-
inal 1935 paradox [6], for continuous variables, exist for the quadrature phase amplitudes of
two spatially separated fields [7]. The technology of quadrature phase amplitude measure-
ment is sufficiently advanced that in 1992 these correlations were detected, without detection
efficiency problems, by Ou et al [8]. Such EPR correlated beams have recently been utilized
to enable quantum state teleportation with continuous variables [9]. Further work [10] has
shown that quadrature phase amplitude measurements on certain twin beams can predict
violations of Bell inequalities.
Consider the nondegenerate parametric down conversion process, modeled by two field
2
modes with boson operators aˆ and bˆ, with the interaction Hamiltonian HI = ih¯κ(aˆ
†bˆ†− aˆbˆ).
We define the quadrature phase amplitudes Xˆa = (aˆ + aˆ
†), Pˆa = (aˆ − aˆ†)/i, Xˆb = (bˆ + bˆ†)
and Pˆb = (bˆ − bˆ†)/i. The Heisenberg uncertainty relation for the orthogonal amplitudes of
mode aˆ is ∆2Xa∆
2Pa ≥ 1. The output quadrature amplitudes are
Xˆa(t) = Xˆa(0)cosh(κt) + Xˆb(0)sinh(κt)
Xˆb(t) = Xˆb(0)cosh(κt) + Xˆa(0)sinh(κt)
Pˆa(t) = Pˆa(0)cosh(κt)− Pˆb(0)sinh(κt)
Pˆb(t) = Pˆb(0)cosh(κt)− Pˆa(0)sinh(κt). (1)
where κ is proportional to the strength of parametric interaction and the t = 0 operators
represent inputs. As κt increases, Xˆa(t) becomes increasingly correlated with Xˆb(t), and
Pˆa(t) becomes increasingly correlated with −Pˆb(t), the correlation becoming perfect in the
limit κT → ∞. With output fields aˆ and bˆ spatially separated, this is the situation [7] of
the 1935 EPR correlations.
For imperfect correlation, the degree of correlation may still be sufficient to ensure EPR
correlations [7]. The results for measurements Xˆa(t) and Xˆb(t) (or Pˆa(t) and Pˆb(t)) can be
compared, yielding an estimate of the error in inferring the result of measurement Xˆa(t)
on mode aˆ, based on a measurement Xˆb(t) on mode bˆ. We calculate δx = Xˆa(t) − γXˆb(t)
and δp = Pˆa(t) + γPˆb(t), where the factor γ may be modified to give the minimum error.
One can calculate the variances associated with the inference of Xˆa from γXˆb, and Pˆa from
γPˆb: ∆
2
x,inf =< δ
2
x > − < δx >2 and ∆2p,inf =< δ2p > − < δp >2. The minimum variance
∆2x,inf,min (and ∆
2
p,inf,min) occurs for a particular value of γ. Finding the turning point with
γ yields (with γ =< Xˆa(T ), Xˆb(T ) > /∆
2Xˆb(T )) ∆
2
x,inf,min =
∆Xˆ2a(T )∆Xˆ
2
b
(T )−[<Xˆa(T ),Xˆb(T )>]
2
∆Xˆ2
b
(T )
,
where < x, y >=< xy > − < x >< y > and one deduces a ∆2p,inf,min in similar fashion.
EPR correlations are obtained when the product ∆2x,inf∆
2
p,inf drops below the quantum
limit given by ∆2Xa∆
2Pa ≥ 1 [7]:
∆2x,inf∆
2
p,inf < 1. (2)
For arbitrary coherent input states, we predict from (1) [7] (γ = tanh 2κt)
∆2x,inf,min = ∆
2
p,inf,min = 1/ cosh 2κt (3)
An identical argument and results hold if the measured operators are Xa− < Xa >, Xb− <
Xb >, Pa− < Pa > and Pb− < Pb >, the fluctuations about the mean, as opposed to Xa,
Xb, Pa and Pb.
With vacuum inputs to aˆ and bˆ, Bob and Alice can secure a random key, using the po-
tentially perfect correlation between quadrature amplitudes. We propose a different scheme,
to allow for predetermined sequences, and imperfect correlation. For the purposes of cryp-
tography (Figure 1), Alice chooses as input to the nondegenerate parametric amplifier one
of two possible states: the input for aˆ is either a coherent state |α0 expipi/4 >a (bit value
1) or a coherent state |α1 expipi/4 >a (bit value 0), where α0 and α1 are real. The input
for bˆ is a vacuum state |0 >b. The signal is transmitted by spatially separating the two
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output fields and propagating to Bob the output field of mode aˆ. Bob can read the mes-
sage by measuring either Xˆa(t) or Pˆa(t). Suppose Bob chooses to measure Xˆa(t). The
probability distribution for his obtaining a result x, given Alice’s choice |α0 expipi/4 >, is
the gaussian exp [−(x−√2α0 cosh κt)2/2σ2]/σ
√
2pi with mean
√
2α0 cosh κt and standard
deviation σ =
√
cosh 2κt. If Alice chose |α1 expipi/4 > the probability for Bob’s outcome is
exp [−(x−√2α1 cosh κt)2/2σ2]/σ
√
2pi, the gaussian mean shifted by
√
2(α0 − α1) cosh κt.
Provided σ ≪ √2(α0 − α1) coshκt, the bit value is clearly determined from Bob’s result x
(Figure 2): x near
√
2α0 cosh κt implies 1; x near
√
2α1 cosh κt implies zero. The bit value
can also be determined by a measurement of quadrature phase amplitude Pˆa(t), in this case
the input |α0 expipi/4 > giving a gaussian distribution about
√
2α0 cosh κt (bit value 1), while
|α1 expipi/4 > gives a distribution centered about
√
2α1 cosh κt (bit value 0).
Bob records the results of his consecutive quadrature phase measurements, randomly
selecting to measure either Xˆa(t) or Pˆa(t), and subtracting from his result either
√
2α0 cosh κt
or
√
2α1 cosh κt, so that only the fluctuation about the mean of the particular distribution is
recorded (Figure 2). Bob then communicates to Alice, through a public channel, the sequence
of recorded fluctuations together with measurements (Xˆa(t) or Pˆa(t)) chosen (the bit value
itself is not communicated). Alice also makes a sequence of consecutive measurements Xˆb(t)
or Pˆb(t), (preferably) to coincide with Bob’s measurement sequence, and records similarly
only the fluctuation about the mean (in this case
√
2α0 sinh κt or
√
2α1 sinh κt for Xb, and
−√2α0 sinh κt or −
√
2α1 sinh κt for Pb). Bob and Alice compare notes, through the public
channel, to calculate a ∆2x,inf∆
2
p,inf . The predicted minimum is, for optimized γ, given by
(3).
Verification by Bob and Alice of the EPR correlations ∆2x,inf∆
2
p,inf < 1 gives an indication
of interference by an eavesdropper (Eve). Let us consider various practical options by Eve.
To determine the signal Eve’s first obvious choice may be to capture the field aˆ and measure
either Xˆa or Pˆa. If she is able to predetermine correctly for each bit value the choice (Xˆa
or Pˆa) to be made by Bob, Eve can make the same choice and conceal her eavesdropping.
However Bob’s choice is delayed until after his detection of aˆ forcing errors in Eve’s selection.
Quantum mechanics makes it impossible for Eve to measure both amplitudes (Xˆa and Pˆa)
to an uncertainty better than that given by the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. More
importantly, Eve cannot regenerate and transmit to Bob a single mode state with both
well defined Xˆ and Pˆ , but is limited by ∆2Xˆ∆2Pˆ ≥ 1. For example Eve may select to
measure Xˆa rather precisely so that the error in the measurement is of order ∆m
2 = 1/r,
where r > 1. Eve may then generate, to transmit to Bob, a “squeezed” state with this
reduced fluctuation in X , so that the new operator describing the quadrature measurement
now made by Bob is Xˆnewa = xa + δXˆa where xa is the result of Eve’s measurement and
∆2δXˆa = 1/r. Quantum mechanics compels an enhanced fluctuation in Pˆ , so that the
operator describing the quadrature measurement Pˆa made by Bob on this retransmitted
state is Pˆ newa = pa + δPˆa where at best ∆
2δPˆ = r for a minimum uncertainty squeezed
state. The variances ∆2x,inf,min and ∆
2
p,inf,min testing for supposed EPR correlations are
now ∆2xnew ,inf,min = ∆
2
x,inf,min + ∆
2δXˆa and ∆
2
pnew,inf,min = ∆
2
p,inf,min + ∆
2δPˆ , where here
we have ∆2x,inf,min = ∆
2
p,inf,min = 1/ cosh κt. This gives ∆
2
x,inf,min∆
2
p,inf,min ≥ 1, and EPR
correlations are lost, making a sensitive test for interference on aˆ. We note that it is possible
for Eve to gain access to bit values, but whether this has occurred is later checked by
4
communication between sender and receiver.
To improve her chances, as discussed by Ralph [4], Eve may alternatively opt to make
a partial interference of beam a by tapping off only part of the beam using a partially-
transmitting beam splitter, with a and avac as inputs, where avac is a vacuum input (Figure
3). The outputs are: aˆBob =
√
ηaˆ +
√
1− ηaˆvac, the field transmitted and detected by Bob;
and aˆEve =
√
1− ηaˆ − √ηaˆvac, the field detected by Eve to allow her measurement of Xa.
Here η gives the fraction of photons transmitted, on to Bob, by the beamsplitter. We define
the quadrature amplitudes XˆBoba = aˆBob + aˆ
†
Bob, Pˆ
Bob
a = (aˆBob − aˆ†Bob)/i, XˆEvea = aˆEve + aˆ†Eve
and PˆEvea = (aˆEve − aˆ†Eve)/i. For a vacuum input we have ∆2Xˆvac = ∆2Pˆvac = 1.
XˆBoba (t) =
√
ηXa(t) +
√
1− ηXvac
XˆEvea (t) =
√
ηXvac −
√
1− ηXa(t)
PˆBoba (t) =
√
ηPa(t) +
√
1− ηPvac
PˆEvea (t) =
√
ηPvac −
√
1− ηPa(t) (4)
The variances ∆2x,inf,min and ∆
2
p,inf,min later measured by Alice and Bob, testing for EPR
correlations, are now
∆2xnew ,inf,min = η∆
2
x,inf,min + (1− η)∆2Xˆvac
∆2pnew ,inf,min = η∆
2
p,inf,min + (1− η)∆2Pˆvac (5)
With η → 1 the back-action noise (√1− ηXvac for measurement X) feeding into Bob’s sig-
nal as a result of Eve’s tapping is decreased. In this limit, the change (1 − η)∆2Xˆvac and
(1− η)∆2Pˆvac to the variances ∆2x,inf and ∆2p,inf respectively, as a result of Eve’s eavesdrop-
ping becomes increasingly undetectable. Eve however pays the price, since she observes a re-
duced signal (−√1− ηXa(t) for the measurement X) with increased noise (due to √ηXvac),
limiting her ability to obtain information from the channel. Witn noise
√
ηXvac from the
vacuum input increasing as η → 1, a point is reached where she can no longer resolve the
two peaks, separated by
√
2
√
1− η cosh κt(α0 − α1), giving the bit value.
In an effort to reduce the feedback noise (1 − η)∆2Xˆvac in Bob’s signal, and to allow
better resolution of the bit value for larger η, Eve may choose to perform a quantum non-
demolition measurement of quadrature amplitude Xˆa (Figure 3). Such measurements allow
accurate determination of Xˆa (to ∆
2Xˆ ≤ 1) and have been achieved experimentally [11].
The quantum nondemolition measurement may be performed using the beam splitter as
above (Figure 3) but where avac is a squeezed vacuum input so that ∆
2Xˆvac < 1 (suppose
∆Xˆvac = 1/r). Increased squeezing of the fluctuation in Xvac (∆
2Xˆvac → 0) implies that
XBoba (t) =
√
ηXa(t) and X
Eve
a = −
√
1− ηXa(t) and perfect inference of Xa(t) is obtain-
able by Eve, without any feedback vacuum noise in the value XBob(t) later measured by
Bob. However large fluctuations in Pvac (we must have ∆Pˆvac = r to satisfy the uncertainty
principle for the squeezed vacuum input state) necessarily create a large noise in PBoba .
PBoba (t) =
√
ηPa(t) +
√
1− ηPvac (6)
This excess noise, detectable when Bob selects to measure P rather than X , causes an
increase in ∆2pnew,inf,min = η∆
2
p,inf,min + (1− η)∆2Pˆvac, alerting Bob to Eve’s interference.
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The presence of loss due to transmission will also reduce the EPR correlation. Loss (and
detection inefficiencies) may be modeled by a beam splitter which mixes our signal mode aˆ
with a vacuum field aˆvac to give a new output at Bob’s detector: aˆ
new =
√
ηaˆ+
√
1− ηaˆvac.
Here η is the overall efficiency factor (η → 1 for no loss). The new noise levels measured by
Bob are
∆2xnew ,inf,min = η
2∆2x,inf,min + (1− η2)
∆2pnew,inf,min = η
2∆2p,inf,min + (1− η2). (7)
With η > 0, a partial loss, EPR correlations are still maintained, though decreased. For
complete loss we obtain ∆2xnew ,inf,min = ∆
2
pnew,inf,min = 1.
In practice, the degree of EPR correlation for a given transmission line and distance
would be accurately established. This degree of correlation is independent of Alice’s bit
value. Any increase of our EPR noise indicator above this pre-evaluated level alerts Bob to
the additional loss caused by a partial tapping of the channel by Eve.
Security is also provided by comparing individual results of measurements made by Alice
and Bob. For a given transmission line and loss along this line, and for a given bit value
(based on the choice α) the mean and shape (the shape is predicted to be independent of the
bit value) of the measured distribution can also be accurately recorded. A specified result for
the measurement (or fluctuation about the mean) Xb made by Alice will imply a conditional
probability distribution for the measurement (or fluctuation about mean) Xa made by Bob.
In the absence of loss the variance of this conditional distribution is ∆2x,inf,min. Loss increases
the variance by the amount given above in (7). Significant deviation of a result for Bob from
this distribution is indication of Eve’s presence. Importantly loss acts to increase noise levels
in X and P equally. Marked increase, for some of the bit values sent, in the deviation of
Bob’s measurement from Alice’s predicted result for Bob would alert Alice and Bob to the
possibility of Eve having performed a quantum nondemolition measurement as discussed
above.
Eve’s best chance then may be to perform measurement with a partial beam splitter
with standard vacuum input, in the hope that the extra noise put back into Bob’s channel
will not be noticeable over loss. To safeguard against this Alice and Bob must evaluate by
measurements the minimum extra noise, or additional loss, for which they would conclude
the existence of a potential eavesdropper. With this value of η Eve could have performed
a measurement (4) and would be compelled to infer a bit value based on extra noise levels
as indicated by (4). Bob and Alice must select the difference between inputs α0 and α1 so
that Eve is unable to resolve the bit value with this extra noise.
Schemes using the violation of a bell inequality [2] can also be proposed for continuous
variable quadrature phase detection, since the failure of local realism has recently [10] been
predicted possible for such measurements, for certain types of quantum states. One such
state is the pair-coherent state [10]
|Ψ >= N
∫ 2pi
0
|r0eiς >a |r0e−iς >b dς (8)
Here N is a normalization coefficient, we choose r0 = 1.1 and |α >q (q = a, b) is a coher-
ent state for the mode qˆ. Also we might consider the two-mode “Schrodinger cat” state
undergoing interaction for a time t with a parametric amplifier [10]
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|Ψ >= NUˆ (|α0 >a |β0 >b +| − α0 >a | − β0 >b) (9)
where U = exp [−iHˆIt/h¯], and we choose α0 = β0 = 0.9 and κt = 0.6 Our protocol is not a
direct parallel of Ekert’s for spin-1/2 particles, because for states (8) and (9) there is not a
perfect correlation between quadrature amplitude measurements on aˆ, bˆ.
After generation of the state (8) (or (9)), the two fields aˆ and bˆ are spatially separated.
Alice may then choose to phase shift the field aˆ by 180o or not, this choice of relative
phase between aˆ and bˆ being her signal. The field aˆ is then propagated to Bob at a distant
location A. The signal is transmitted from Alice to Bob in the form of blocks, consisting
of many (N say where N is large) identical states with the same value of phase shift. Bob
measures at a location A a quadrature phase amplitude XˆAθ = Xˆa cos θ + Pˆa sin θ for each
state comprising a certain block, where θ randomly varies between θ = 0, pi/2, 3pi/2, for
state (8) (or between θ = 0, 0.42pi,−0.28pi, 1.42pi, 0.72pi for state (9)). Alice also makes a
series of measurements XˆBφ = Xˆb cosφ + Pˆb sinφ at a location B, where φ randomly varies
between φ = 0,−pi/4,−3pi/4, for state (8) (or between φ = 0,−0.28pi, 0.42pi for state (9)).
Alice then communicates to Bob through a public channel the results for her quadrature
phase amplitude measurements.
Bob may build up, for each block, the probability distribution P (qa, qb) for getting results
qa and qb upon measurement of Xˆa at aˆ and Xˆb at bˆ respectively. This information is given
by the θ = 0 and φ = 0 measurements. The shape of the distribution changes with the
choice of phase shift, and gives the bit value. This information is not determinable from
the measurements of amplitudes made on bˆ alone, and hence cannot be determined by the
information passed along the public channel.
To check whether eavesdropping has occurred, Bob tests for a Bell inequality. The result
of the measurement is classified as +1 if the quadrature phase result x is greater than or
equal to zero, and −1 otherwise. We define the probability distributions: PA+ (θ) for obtaining
+1 at aˆ upon measurement of XˆAθ ; P
B
+ (φ) for obtaining +1 at bˆ upon measurement of Xˆ
B
φ ;
and PAB++ (θ, φ) the joint probability of obtaining a +1 result at both aˆ and bˆ. The existence
of a local hidden variable theory implies the “strong” Bell-Clauser-Horne inequality [3].
S =
PAB++ (θ, φ)− PAB++ (θ, φ′) + PAB++ (θ′, φ) + PAB++ (θ′, φ′)
PA+ (θ′) + P
B
+ (φ)
≤ 1 (10)
For state (8), a violation of this inequality occurs with S ≈ 1.0157, and with angles given by
θ = 0, φ = −pi/4, θ′ = pi/2, φ′ = −3pi/4 [10]. For state (9), violation given by S = 1.008 is
obtained for angles θ = 0.42pi, φ = −0.28pi, θ′ = 0.28pi, φ′ = 0.42pi [10]. The above violations
also hold for the states generated by phase shifting aˆ by 180o, with the choice of angles for
φ as before, but replacing θ with θ + pi and θ′ with θ′ + pi.
Violation of the Bell inequality at the level predicted by quantum mechanics ensures
that no interference by Eve has occurred along aˆ (see Ekert [2]). Suppose Eve performs a
measurement on the field aˆ, measuring XˆAθ0 say to obtain a result xθ0 . She then generates
and transmits to Bob a state |Φxθ0 ,θ0 >. The density operator for the new combined system
is ρ = ρBxθ0 ,θ0
ρAxθ0 ,θ0
where ρBxθ0 ,θ0
=< xθ0 |Ψ >< Ψ|xθ0 > is the reduced density matrix for field
bˆ given the measurement by Eve, |xθ0 > is the eigenstate of XˆAθ0 , and ρAxθ0 ,θ0 = |Φxθ0 ,θ0 ><
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Φxθ0 ,θ0 |. Bob tests for the Bell inequality using PABx,y (θ, φ), the joint probability for respective
results x and y for measurements XˆAθ and Xˆ
B
φ . With intervention,
PABx,y (θ, φ) =
∑
xθ0
∑
θ0
P (xθ0 , θ0)
< yφ| < xθ0 |Ψ >< Ψ|xθ0 > |yφ >
< xθ|Φxθ0 ,θ0 >< Φxθ0 ,θ0|xθ > (11)
where P (xθ0 , θ0) is the probability that Eve obtains a result xθ0 for her measurement. We
have the form PABx,y (θ, φ) =
∫
ρ(λ) pAx (θ, λ)p
B
y (φ, λ) dλ from which a Bell inequality fol-
lows, regardless of the state regenerated by Eve.
In terms of feasibility, the second scheme based on the Bell inequality is more likely to
be limited by difficulty of state preparation and susceptibility to loss (η = 0.96 destroys
violations [10])and is greatly limited by its use of redundancy.
The first scheme, not so limited, may offer advantages over schemes utilizing photon
counting. The high detection efficiencies give a very much reduced overall loss factor, which
may make it possible to transmit directly and efficiently a predetermined message, later
checking providing a means to check security. The generation and detection of EPR corre-
lations with ∆2x,inf∆
2
p,inf = 0.7 has been achieved
[8]. The generation of squeezed (where
∆2XˆAθ < 1 for some θ) optical and soliton pulses
[12] opens up possibilities for transmission
of EPR correlated fields. The robustness of squeezing to propagation loss has not been
keenly explored, but similar distances should be achievable for EPR correlations. This loss
represents the chief limitation to long distance transmission, since loss acts to degrade the
EPR correlations which must be kept at ∆2x,inf∆
2
p,inf < 1. Repeated detection and regen-
eration of the signal with new EPR fields could help combat loss. Security then relies on
a set of senders and receivers being able to communicate reliably at a later stage, after the
detections.
In recent applications [9] EPR beams have been generated as the two outputs of a
beam splitter with inputs a squeezed vacuum state. It would be possible to use such EPR
systems for our cryptography scheme where the squeezed vacuum is replaced by an amplitude
squeezed state.
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FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the EPR cryptographic scheme. The EPR device generates
fields aˆ and bˆ which are EPR correlated. The bit value is given by Alice’s choice of input to aˆ.
P
x 
0 +1
X
~
FIG. 2. Schematic plot of the probability distribution P = P (x) for obtaining a result x upon
measurement of the quadrature phase amplitude of a or b, where one gaussian peak represents
input |α0 expipi/4 >a (bit value 1) and the other input |α1 expipi/4 >a (bit value 0). Bob is able
to infer the bit value from x and record, for later communication to Alice, the deviation X˜ of his
result from the (known) mean of the distribution as indicated.
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FIG. 3. Schematic representation of Eve’s attempt to make measurement of Xa(t) using a
partial beam splitter.
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